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Does modernity still matter? Evaluating the concept of multiple 
modernities and its alternatives 
Elsje Fourie 
 
Abstract 
In recent years, the concept of multiple modernities has emerged to challenge the perceived 
Eurocentrism and unilinearity of traditional theories of convergence, and has led to renewed 
efforts to appreciate differing trajectories of contemporary political and social development.  Its 
exponents’ key argument—that forms of modernity are so varied and so contingent on culture 
and historical circumstance that the term itself must be spoken of in the plural—is particularly 
pertinent in an era where prevailing ‘Western’ models of development are becoming less 
influential.   
This paper seeks to provide an examination of the main principles of this approach, a synthesis 
of its evolution and an analysis of its strengths and shortcomings.  It examines the application of 
the theory to the case of Indian modernity, before addressing several alternative approaches 
that have attempted to fill similar gaps in the literature. It concludes with some thoughts on the 
future and feasibility of the study of modernity itself.  
The paper finds that multiple modernities has been useful in widening the scope of study, and 
that it focuses on important questions that its rivals have not yet addressed.  However, it has not 
yet adequately identified the 'core' of modernity itself, nor has it refuted the charge of cultural 
essentialism.  For modernity to retain utility as a concept, it must ultimately be viewed as a 
single, coherent force, albeit one which is continually contested and reversible, and which has 
vastly differing impacts on different societies.  By addressing the ways in which this force is 
creatively adapted and its manifestations socially constructed, multiple modernities will be able 
to better identify the many ways in which societies can be modern today.   
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1 Introduction 
Some, of course, question the value of the very idea of modernity, but the word is 
all around us, and it may already be too late to legislate its uses. The rhetoric itself 
may be taken as a sign that, in spite of our contemporary intellectual incredulity 
toward them, historicist or stageist ideas of history and modernity are never far 
from our thoughts.  We must, therefore, engage and reengage our ideas about 
modernity in a spirit of constant vigilance 
Dipesh Chakrabarty (2002: xx) 
Although the gap between academic and popular discourse is often wide, in the case of certain 
concepts this gap can become a chasm.  One such unfortunate term is modernity: it has been 
unfashionable in the social sciences—and especially in its parent discipline of sociology—for 
some time now, and has been disowned and deconstructed to the extent that no formal 
discussion of it seems complete without a distancing of author to subject.  Yet switch on a 
television, open a newspaper or stroll through any city and one is likely to encounter the term or 
its variants; clearly, ‘modernity is in the streets more than ever’ (Kaya 2004: 47), and so 
continues to shape our understanding of the world around us.   
The past decade has seen the emergence of several academic alternatives attempting to 
reconcile the criticisms of modernity with its continued utility, and thereby bridge this divide.  
One of the most influential of these, the theory of multiple modernities, has argued that 
modernity continues to have an undeniable global impact, but that this impact is so radically 
mediated by the historical and cultural backgrounds of each society it encounters that it makes 
more sense to speak of the concept in the plural.   
This paper examines the theory of multiple modernities and its central assumptions and 
problematiques, before critically assessing its strengths and shortcomings.  Multiple modernities 
has undoubtedly attracted valuable debate, but has not yet made the inroads into scholarly or 
public debates that its proponents have hoped for.  The paper explores why this is the case, 
before looking at how the theory has been applied to a real-world case of non-Western 
’modernity’, namely that of India.  In doing so, I examine some alternatives that have attempted 
to fill similar gaps in the literature, before concluding with some thoughts on the future and 
feasibility of the study of modernity.  
2 Multiple modernities: Assumptions and central questions 
2.1 Starting points 
Multiple modernities theory, being of recent origin and placing an emphasis on diversity, is 
neither fully developed in form nor homogenous in content.  The term was coined in the late 
1990s by sociologist Schmuel Eisenstadt, who in many ways has been the architect of the theory.  
Two additional important early scholars, Johann Arnason and Bjorn Wittrock, have been joined 
by a range of theorists with a variety of interpretations, many from societies in which modernity 
is said to diverge from the traditional ‘norm’.   
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And, indeed, if there is one starting point on which advocates of multiple modernities converge, 
despite their differences, it is a rejection of the traditional theories of modernisation.  These are 
criticised for two fundamental teleological assumptions, namely that modernity is a single, 
unified homogenising process, and that the West is the yardstick by which success is measured 
(Kaviraj 2005, Eisenstadt 2005).  The convergence theories of Talcott Parsons and others, 
influential during the 1950s and 1960s, come under particular attack for assuming that structural 
differentiation and the growth of institutions such as liberal democracy, the free market and the 
bureaucratic state are inevitable in ‘modernising’ societies throughout the world and will 
naturally be accompanied by individualism, a secular-rational world view and other cultural 
dimensions.  For Parsons (1966), societies have little choice but to follow a unilinear path from 
the primitive to the modern, and it is this view of modernity ‘as a uniform, unambiguously 
structured pattern in progress towards harmonious integration’ (Kaya 2004: 36) to which 
multiple modernity theorists take particular exception. 
Most multiple modernity theorists are also highly sceptical of the classical modernisation 
theories of Weber, Hegel, Marx and Habermas, reading them as parochial and focused on the 
impact of single cultural or institutional factors (Tu 2005: 198).  A few accounts (Eisenstadt et al 
2002) have a more nuanced reading and see in the earliest literature an awareness of both the 
liberating and destructive elements of modernity, but most object to what they see as a 
determinism and exceptionalism that fail to provide an accurate picture of global processes.  
Similarly, although there is some recognition that these traditional accounts have become 
contested since the 1970s and 1980s, multiple modernity theorists argue that a new set of 
totalising theories have emerged since the end of the Cold War.   Many write of the need for a 
third way between Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ thesis (the logical endpoint of 
homogenisation) and Huntington’s (1996) ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (which views modernity as 
uniquely Western) (Eisenstadt et al 2002: 2).    
In place of these theories, then, the theory of multiple modernities argues that all modernisation 
should be seen in the light of its historical context.  Because the impact of modernity around the 
world is and always has been highly contingent on the cultural backgrounds of individual 
societies, its ideological and institutional manifestations are bound to vary greatly.  According to 
Eisenstadt (2005: 2), modernity is a process of ‘continual constitution and reconstitution of a 
multiplicity of cultural programmes’, whereas Kaviraj (2005: 138) likens modernisation to the 
process of learning a new language but retaining one's original accent and thought patterns.    
A further central tenet and starting point for the theory is the fact that modernity has been 
‘multiple’ from its beginnings, and that, until very recently, large parts of Europe could scarcely 
be called modern themselves.  Throughout the past two centuries, Western  economies, political 
systems and societies have been organised in very different ways, with the role of the state in 
Europe and the United States being only one example (Wittrock 2005: 33).  Europe, as a whole, 
has never been economically modern and has only very recently become politically modern, if 
these concepts are taken to be synonymous with the liberal market economy and nation-
state/constitutional republic respectively.  Throughout its expansion, modernity has been 
heavily contested in Europe—the Vienna Congress and Holy Alliance were nothing if not 
comprehensive attempts to “make Europe safe for tradition” (Wittrock 2005: 47).  At other 
times, competing visions of modernity in Europe came destructively to blows, as during World 
War II.  As modernity transformed (and was transformed by) Europe, its various incarnations 
 Multiple modernities 
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were exported to the spheres of influence of each ‘modern’ power, with the result that India 
came into contact with a completely different set of values and institutions than did South 
America (Mazlish 2001: 71).  The results were far too complex and multidimensional, hold the 
advocates of multiple modernities, to be described simply as ‘Westernisation’. 
Multiple modernities, in locating the spatial beginnings of modernity, thus accords the European 
experience an important, albeit not homogenous or hegemonic, position.  As regards 
modernity's temporal evolution, there seems to be general agreement that the late 18th  century 
witnessed the deep-seated epistemic transformations and interconnected cultural 
transformations necessary for observers to speak of a new age (Wittrock 2005: 41).  The roots 
may lie deeper, specifically in the urban, feudal, intellectual and papal revolutions of the 12th to 
13th centuries, or the Enlightenment, but it was only really with the American war of secession, 
Industrial revolution and French revolution, advocates argue, that modernity began to emerge 
as a cultural and political programme.  Although the key features of this programme will be 
discussed shortly, it is important to note here that these radical new changes are not held to be 
merely intensifications of trends that had come before, but an abandonment of universal 
Enlightenment values and discourses “in favour of forms of representation and endowment of 
rights based on territoriality or membership in a linguistically and historically constituted and 
constructed community” (Wittrock 2005: 45).   
2.2 The problematiques of multiple modernities 
The past two centuries, thus, have been fundamentally different in some way, but how?  In 
attempting to answer this question, the theory of multiple modernities contains within it three 
additional closely related questions or themes.  The first concerns the antimonies of 
differentiation and integration.  Modernity has always had at its heart a tension between the 
legitimacy of individual interests, on the one hand, and totalising ideologies, on the other 
(Eisenstadt 2005: 8).  Because modernity fosters competing visions of the public good, it 
contains within it the seeds of its own continual destruction and reconstruction.  Multiple 
modernity theorists thus argue that the multiplicity of political and societal forms today are 
merely a continuation of this process and occur within, rather than outside, modernity itself.   
A second question leads on from this, and asks whether modernity is a substantive set of 
processes and phenomena, or merely temporal.  Can we speak of modern societies (and thus 
necessarily of ‘non-modern’ societies) or is it enough to say that we live in an epoch where 
modernity has become a common global condition?  Multiple modernity theorists, on the whole, 
tend towards the latter conclusion: to Wittrock (2005: 38), our age is marked by the fact that 
modernity now forms a reference point around which even its self-professed opponents must 
construct their opposition and identities. These theorists thus view the ascendancy of challenges 
to liberalism not—as some would—as the beginning of a postmodern condition, but as the 
continual reinterpretation and contestation of a concept whose demise many have been too 
quick to herald.    
Some of the literature takes this open-ended notion of modernity to considerable lengths, 
viewing it ‘as a loosely-structured constellation, open to modification and redefinitions’ (Arnason 
2002: 132).  Some proponents argue that attaching a definition to modernity will render it a 
closed monolith and that it is thus ‘neither necessary nor possible to work outside modernity’ 
Bath Papers in International Development 
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(Kaya 2004: 45).  The extent to which certain societies are ‘modern’ or ‘not modern’ is 
considered less important that the doing away with such binary oppositions altogether.   
However, several other exponents of the theory have remarked on the potential erosion and 
loss of meaning that such an amorphous approach can entail (Gole 2005: 91) and have 
attempted to define the core—and thereby also the limits—of modernity.  This core is never 
institutional or organisational, but situated at the far more abstract level of ontological and 
cultural orientations.  This, ideally, allows multiple modernities to explain the evolution of 
political and economic forms around a number of fixed principles.   
The most important of these principles is a conception of human agency that was radically new 
at the time that it developed two centuries ago—a conception of humans as autonomous and 
able to exercise control over their environment through rational mastery and conscious activity 
(Eisenstadt 2005).  Societies hitherto embedded in a worldview ordained by God were freed to 
reevaluate the foundations on which they operated, and to construct new institutions 
accordingly.   
This critical notion of mastery of self, society and nature had numerous consequences.  New 
forms of popular participation were born, and the relationship between the centre and 
periphery were inexorably redefined.  The identities of the individual moved beyond the fixed, 
the local and the narrow and began to take on universal significance (Lerner and Inkeles quoted 
in Eisenstadt 2005: 4).  The vision of political and public space was transformed, and with it the 
very relationship between the polity, society and civil society.   
To Wittrock (2005: 137), modernity offered and continues to offer a specific set of what he 
terms ‘promissory notes’, namely the standards that macrosocietal institutions are held up to, at 
least in principle.  Every society articulates promissory notes, which are publicly expressed, 
realisable, and, in acting as points of departure for proposals and counterproposals, form 
“generalised reference points” for that society.  What makes the promissory notes of modernity 
unique seems to be the new forms of political organisation they advocate, as well as the 
controversy and revolutionary upheaval around which they centre (Wittrock 2005: 42).   
This potential for revolutionary upheaval is crucial.  Many authors emphasise the utopian and 
even eschatological or Jacobin visions which seem to play such an important role in modern 
political and cultural programmes (for example Eisenstadt 2001).  Because modernity is, in one 
sense, so totalising and irreversible, themes of protest and the complete reinvention of society 
feature strongly.  Conflict and struggle is inherent in modernity, be it conflict between multiple 
cultural orientations (Arnason 2002: 133) or between competing visions of the collective good 
within a polity.   This renders modernity, and modernising societies, highly reflexive, self-
questioning and self-conscious.  In a sense, modernity places agents outside of their time and 
place, bringing about an unprecedented historical consciousness. 
2.3 Contributions and challenges: 
Multiple modernities shares much of the above definition with other contemporary sociological 
scholarship.  Modernity's emphasis on autonomy and agency (Wagner 2008a, Chakrabarty 2002: 
46) as well as its revolutionary potential and reflexivity (see particularly Kolakowski's (1990) 
famous characterisation of modernity as being ‘on endless trial’) are not unique to the theory.   
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However, the contribution of the multiple modernities theory lies in the thesis that cultural and 
historical backgrounds lead different civilisations to have sufficiently different interpretations of 
these core features so as to result in various ‘modernities’.  Something fundamental clearly 
separates us from our pre-modern ancestors, it remarks, and yet the spread of institutions has 
been so uneven that the change must lie elsewhere.  Cultural orientations are embodied in 
institutions, but are not reducible to them (Arnason 2005: 65).  Multiple modernities is thus a 
uniquely cultural theory of modernity (while still firmly situated in the social sciences).  
Coinciding with the so-called “cultural turn” witnessed by the discipline in the 1990s, its 
proponents have argued strongly against a perceived neglect of cross-cultural and comparative-
historical analysis.   
One of the most controversial aspects of multiple modernities has been its focus on civilisational 
analysis.  This ontological bias towards civilisations (in the plural) is borne partially out of the 
need to combat the view of Civilisation (capitalised and in the singular) which was once so 
prominent in discussions on progress, and partially due to the view of modernity as a conscious 
political and cultural project.  
Whatever the weaknesses of such an approach (and these will be discussed shortly), it opens the 
way for two further contributions.  Firstly, being site-based, it allows for the examination of 
several highly topical cases.  China, and East Asia more generally, come under particularly 
intense scrutiny, sometimes as instances of ‘Confucian modernity’ (Tu 2005, Wakeman 2001).  In 
a region where elites have been struggling for more than a century to formulate their responses 
and construct their own identity in reference to modernity, the tensions between supposedly 
value-neutral modern imports such as technology and the cultural heart that elites have sought 
to preserve have been profound (Wakeman 2001). Islamic, Communist, American—and, as we 
shall see in a moment, Indian—modernities are similarly analysed.   
In addition, a cultural focus has allowed for the examination of the complex interplay between 
the “modern” and the “traditional” in the creation of cultural identities globally.  Elites and 
intellectuals have been able to participate actively in some of the practices of modernity whilst 
actively rejecting others.  As Eisenstadt (2005: 14) puts it, it has been ‘possible for these groups 
to incorporate some of the Western universalistic elements of modernity in the construction of 
their own new collective identities, without necessarily giving up specific components of their 
traditional identitities’.  For many around the world, modernity has been double-edged, 
containing within itself both the hope of freedom and material benefit, but also the loss of 
identity.  This ‘ambivalence of universalising visions’ (Sachsenmaier 2001: 45), this threat of 
destruction and promise of emancipation can only be theorised by a conception of modernity 
and culture that sees the two as intertwined rather than in continual opposition. 
Criticisms of traditional modernity theory have been numerous in recent decades.  However, 
they have tended to take either the form of postmodern accounts of disillusionment from the 
West or, as one author points out (Sachsenmaier 2001: 60), have been articulated within specific 
national contexts (such as that of Turkey) which have portrayed themselves as the sole hold-outs 
in a modernised, homogenised world and nation.  Multiple modernities must thus be given 
considerable credit for taking the first step towards constructing a comprehensive cultural 
critique of modernity theory while simultaneously acknowledging the continued importance of 
the concept itself. 
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However, a number of criticisms can, in turn, be levelled against the theory of multiple 
modernities itself.  Firstly, it tends to misrepresent—or at the very least engage insufficiently 
with—its predecessors and contemporaries.  Particularly those authors who condemn all prior 
modernisation theory as panglossian or unilinear forget, for example, Weber's Iron Cage of 
bureaucratic control and economic compulsion, or the irony in his remark that ‘in Western 
civilisation and in Western civilisation only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like 
to think), lie in a line of development having universal significance and value’ (Weber 1920/2002: 
13—my emphasis).  Even the convergence theory of Parsons and others does not claim that all 
difference between (or within) cultures will disappear and that countries will become exact 
replicas of the United States, as multiple modernities’ most insistent critic has pointed out 
(Schmidt 2008: 4). 
Similarly, there is little meaningful engagement or refutation of postmodernism, yet any theorist 
which claims that scholars have only very recently ‘begun to pose serious questions about 
“Eurocentric” theories of modernity’ (Kaya 2004: 36) must first explain why the questions of 
postmodernism (or, for that matter, Islamic fundamentalism) are not considered to have at least 
started the ball rolling. 
By dismissing all prior discussions of modernity as Western in nature, multiple modernities does 
a disservice to the rich and varied tradition that has existed for decades in the developing world, 
in fields such as subaltern studies (for example, Chakrabarty 2002)1. Multiple modernities 
remains unique in its project to move beyond these criticisms into a more coherent theoretical 
whole, yet it would do well to take them into greater consideration.   
Secondly, the theory exhibits serious ontological confusion at times, especially in its 
inconsistency regarding units of analysis.  At times, each civilisation is seen to have its own 
variant of modernity, while elsewhere the state or religion are seen as providing the major 
dividing lines between ‘modernities’.  For Eisenstadt (2005: 4), for example, ‘cultural entities’ 
such as China, Japan or Western Europe are characterised by certain ‘core identities’ stemming 
from earlier periods of ‘cultural crystallisation’, yet neither of these potentially problematic 
concepts are explained.  If European modernity was as diverse from its birth as the theorists of 
multiple modernities claim, can it be possible to speak of a single Confucian modernity?  It also 
remains unclear why modernity itself is open to constant revision and fragmentation, yet the 
societies it comes into contact with are not.  After all, if modernity is above all a force of 
dynamism and agency, then it would be contradictory to imagine that it can so easily be shaped 
and reified by culture (Wagner 2008a: 3).   
This brings us back to the heart of the problem the theory faces, and the intellectual tightrope it 
will have to walk if it is to achieve lasting explanatory and predictive power.  On the one hand, 
multiple modernities is attempting to deconstruct established notions of the ‘modern’ in order 
to explain the plurality of socio-political forms around the world.  On the other, it realises that it 
is not enough to simply posit infinite, meaningless variation and therefore reverts to exactly the 
casual cultural generalisations it is hoping to avoid.  In so doing, it lays itself open, on the one 
extreme, to charges of essentialism, cultural determination and ahistoricism (as articulated, for 
example, in Wagner 2008a: 3, Des Forges 2002: 672), while, on the other, it can be accused of 
                                                          
1Ashis Nandy's “critical traditionalism”, discussed at length in Chakrabarty, is only one example of the 
theorising that multiple modernities claims has been lacking until recently.    
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stretching the boundaries of modernity so far that they begin to collapse.  Multiple modernities 
theory must be careful to avoid charges that ‘it only distances itself from what it takes to be the 
most objectionable views of modernisation theory without offering an alternative definition’ 
(Schmidt 2006: 78). 
One particular case—that of Islamic fundamentalism—demonstrates this latter danger 
particularly well.  Multiple modernities theory holds that autonomy and rational mastery are 
central to modernity, but that different societies can interpret both of those concepts in 
radically different ways.  For this reason, it argues that these contemporary religious 
fundamentalist movements are themselves modern and are essential in bringing about a 
uniquely ‘Islamic modernity’.  Theorists acknowledge that ‘Islamism rejects the dominant 
features of modernity’ (Gole 2005: 93), and that anti-modern symbolism and a yearning for a 
mythical past set it at odds with certain aspects of the concept.  However, at the same time, 
they argue that because this past is imagined and selectively interpreted, and because a radical 
break with recent history is advocated, Islamism is, paradoxically, only seemingly anti-modern.  
In fact, they hold, its view of the state as sovereign and territorial, and its desire to purify a 
corrupt society, makes it a very modern movement (Kaldor 2003: 2).  Religion, too, is 
reappropriated and subject to constant revision and reflexivity.  In this way, Islamism introduces 
Muslim agency into the modern arena and enables Muslims to participate collectively and 
critically in the modern age.  Participation in Islamist movements, some allege, even allows 
women to redraw the boundaries of traditional gender roles and obtain visibility in public life, 
bringing about what Gole (2005) calls ‘the forbidden modern’. 
Much of this is certainly true: Islamic fundamentalism is possible only in a modern age, as these 
groups’ obsession with modernity makes clear.  It is also true that much of this supposed denial 
of modernity is selective, and that Islamism's interactions with modernity are more 
sophisticated and open to mutual co-option than meets the eye.  However, totalistic, essentialist 
movements have existed before modernity, and, I would argue, are likely to outlive it.  It would 
seem that a modern ideology must not only be self-reflexive, but must have at its heart the 
human autonomy and rationality mentioned previously.  As such, it is doubtful that a religious 
movement which has as its primary aim the ultimate surrender of this agency to some higher, 
transcendental authority can be inherently modern unless the concept is to lose some of its 
meaning.  In addition, an ideology that seeks to return to the past (even in an imagined, 
unrecognisable form), is as much reactionary as it is revolutionary.  Islamic fundamentalism may 
thus be best understood as a critique of modernity.  Rather than speaking of modernities 
defined by Islamic (or Hindu or Christian) fundamentalism, it is perhaps preferable to speak 
rather of religious fundamentalist responses to modernity in societies where the two forces are 
continually engaged in a complex, multidirectional interplay.   
The question of whether this autonomy can be collective as well as individual is a more difficult 
one, and one that Arnason (2005) and others have explored in discussions of communist 
modernity.  Given the impact of Marxist thought on modern state-building and the mobilisation 
of entire societies to create a vision of the future where the traditional bonds on freedom are 
severed forever, the evidence that communism is not a rejection but instead a distinctive model 
of modernity is more conclusive here.  In any case, the concepts of autonomy and rational 
mastery can interpreted differently from society to society, but cannot be stretched indefinitely.     
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3 Indian and Hindu modernities: A case study 
‘Indian modernity’ is another case in which these themes—as well as earlier questions of 
universality versus heterogeneity and of space versus time—come strikingly to the fore.  The 
choice of title already demonstrates the difficulty inherent in determining when ‘cultural 
crystallisation’ has taken place and what its boundaries are.  Unusually among the cases 
examined by the theory, two forms of competing modernities are analysed within the same 
geographical borders, although by no means neatly and without overlap.   
On the one hand, the theory of multiple modernities at times analyses ‘Hindu civilisation’ (e.g. 
Eisenstadt 2001: 37) and its modern manifestations.  These discussions often run along similar 
lines to the abovementioned discussions on Islamic modernity.  Theorists note that groups such 
as the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) respond to the porous nature of the 
modern world by presenting a reified, ahistorical vision of a Hindu culture under attack.   The 
solution of these ‘regressive modernisers’ (Nanda 2003) to the pluralism engendered by 
modernity is the creation of a totalising Hindutva (‘Hinduness’) that can restore the civilisation to 
its former Golden Age. Hinduism, as a translocal cultural regime with the ability to unite mass 
publics, is thus viewed as inherently modern in content (Hefner 1998).   
However, most analyses focus on the development of modernity within the boundaries of the 
modern state of India.  As a state that echoes the political institutional arrangements present in 
much of the West and yet possesses an entirely unique political culture, the case of India makes 
for an intriguing examination into the exportability of the European experience.   
Theorists do not always agree on the origins of Indian modernity, or the forms that it has taken.  
Shulman (2005), for example, believes that modernity in Southern India evolved organically from 
local culture, before sustained contact with the West and several centuries before the ‘modern 
age’.  He uses as an example the 19th century Telugu poet Apparao, who wrote in a colloquial, 
individualised vernacular, touched on ‘modern’ themes of scepticism and utilitarianism, and who 
inspired social reformers with his focus on the injustices of child marriage.  However, the 
aforementioned argument that the cultural developments that occurred during Europe from the 
12th to mid-18th centuries did not, in themselves, fully constitute modernity, seems to this author 
both sound and applicable to this case. 
More convincingly, most theorists of Indian modernity, particularly Schmuel Eisenstadt (2003) 
and Sidupta Kaviraj (2002), hold that the phenomenon grew out of encounters between 
traditional culture and colonialism.2  The integral role of colonialism does not imply, however, 
that India’s path was like that of the West.  Because both the initial conditions and the 
sequencing were so unique in India, the reflexivity inherent in modernity necessitates unique 
outcomes.  As Kaviraj (2002: 140) points out, ‘under Indian conditions, when democracy is 
[already] an established political practice, it seriously affects the actual structure and historical 
path of capitalist development’.  In addition, the British never truly attempted to replicate the 
                                                          
2
 Discussions of Indian modernity are not, of course, limited to the literature on multiple modernities.  As 
has been mentioned elsewhere, the approach would do well to take findings of subaltern and alternative 
modernities scholars (many of whom hail from the subcontinent) into greater account.  The present 
analysis has focused, however, on those scholars who explicitly use the framework of “multiple 
modernities” to analyse the Indian case.  Of these, Eisenstadt and Kaviraj stand out in particular. 
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European state in India, but were careful to exercise control over the political sphere alone and 
thereby retain the subsidiarity and plurality deeply rooted in traditional society (Kaviraj 2002).   
This multiplicity is identified as the key element to have both preceded and defined Indian 
modernity.  For Eisenstadt, India has, for centuries, broadly operated according to a complex 
system of ‘fractured sovereignty’, whereby a range of actors at different levels of society 
possessed a relatively high level of autonomy within their own spheres (Eisenstadt 2003: 790).  
Multiple centres of power linked by a complex set of networks were the norm, leading to 
adaptive and symbiotic modes of social relations.  Orders such as the Brahman (priestly) and 
Kshatriya (military) each possessed different sources of legitimacy and different duties, yet at 
the same time were fluid and continuously open to renegotiation.  Thus even the caste system 
lacked the rigidity and closed nature of many other traditional societies.   
Although pluralism was important for the development of modernities in the West as it was in 
India, Eisenstadt argues that the former was marked by greater antagonism and ideological 
conflict. Church and State in Europe may have been fractured, for example, but each side 
desired ontological control (Eisenstadt 2003: 792). Each side often mooted unification (under 
the dominance of its own particular grouping) as an ideal. 
A consequence of this difference is the relative lack of Jacobin tendencies in Indian modernity.  
According to Eisenstadt (2003: 632), Hinduism less often conceives of the political arena as a 
venue for salvation, and thus India has witnessed fewer attempts at completely reconstructing 
the political order to fit transcendental, totalising visions.  In other words, ‘the principled 
ideological dimension did not constitute a central component of the political process and 
struggle’ (Eisenstadt 2003: 803).  Meaningful change has occurred in India, but it has more often 
been the result of continual, intensive bargaining and power-sharing rather than of revolution.     
Whether British rule intensified or merely mediated these tendencies, it does seem that 
modernity was by no means unilaterally imposed on an unwilling and unmodern populace.  New 
and old elites responded by emulation and opposition respectively (Kaviraj 2002), and external 
forces were both creatively adapted and vigorously debated.  Although the imposition of a 
unified state structure formalised and even rigidified social divisions, the British use of informal 
bargaining procedures and local bureaucrats ensured that the social sector remained relatively 
autonomous and divided along communal lines.    
If Indian modernity has placed a greater emphasis on incremental transformation and diffusion 
of power than has its European counterpart, how has this manifested itself in practical terms—
especially after colonialism?  For one, it can explain how its democracy has endured in the face 
of widespread initial pessimism: by recognising the multi-faceted nature of Indian identity, the 
Indian National Congress was able to create a broadly secular yet heterogeneous nationalism 
that co-opted the opposition and blunted most polarising ideologies (Eisenstadt 2002).  For 
Kaviraj (2002), democracy’s reflexivity lends Indians collective agency and is therefore 
fundamentally modern; it also leads, however, to three local peculiarities: 1) the equality of 
groups within the political system is prioritised over the equality of individuals, 2) a relative lack 
of industrialisation makes rural agrarian groups an unusually powerful lobby, and 3) the 
continuing importance of religion means that a fundamental tension often exists between the 
demands of secularism and of political representativeness.  
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Eisenstadt also harbours doubts about the stability and resilience of the centrist consensus, 
especially since the Indira Ghandi years.  The decay of political institutions, rise of regional 
nationalism and increase of divergent societal demands on a weakening centre may all bring 
about a more tumultuous modernity, but it may also reflect adaptation and greater power-
sharing (Eisenstadt 2003).  Another theorist is less ambivalent, positing that plural democracy 
itself is slowly eroding India’s accommodating tendencies and marginalising minorities (Tambiah 
2005).  The religious nationalism of the BJP and its peers again emerges here as dangerously 
totalising. 
In a sense, this brings us full circle to the opening discussion on Hindu versus Indian modernities.   
The literature on multiple modernities distinguishes between a transnational religious ideology 
that aims to reify and purify the past, and an indigenous set of traditions mediated by the 
colonial and post-colonial experiences of a modern state.  One exemplifies modernity’s Jacobin 
and centralising tendencies, the other its fragmenting and democratising nature.  As they have 
been in frequent opposition to each other throughout the modern age, so they are too in 
contemporary Indian politics.   
At the same time, both illustrate how far multiple modernities has yet to come in delineating the 
boundaries of this nebulous concept.  If modernity signifies human agency, then—to repeat the 
question posed in the discussion on Islamic modernity—can modernity use religion as its rallying 
cry?  If modernity is freedom, or at least the illusion of it, was pre-colonial India more modern 
than British India?  And is the story of Indian modernity simply the story of Indian social and 
political development over the past three centuries, or is there some fundamental distinction? 
Multiple modernities is highly effective in illustrating how modernity in India has been path-
dependent and how the Indian experience has differed from that of the West.  The observations 
of Eisenstadt, Kaviraj and others do also point to an undeniably modern sensibility present in 
India, although they do so directly and without systematically laying out the factors which make 
it so.  This descriptive strength, coupled with a theoretical weakness, very clearly reflects the 
more general state of the approach.  Modernity clearly does differ vastly from place to place, 
and this difference is cultural as well as institutional, but this insight takes us only halfway 
towards uncovering a broader theoretical approach which can be applied to manifestations of 
the modern around the world.   
4 Alternatives to multiple modernities 
Before concluding with some thoughts on how multiple modernities can reconcile some of these 
challenges, it may be useful to briefly examine whether alternative approaches have had greater 
success in reconciling the predictions of traditional modernisation theory with the variety of 
political and social systems in existence today.   
One group of concepts, variously labelled ‘alternative modernities’ (Goankar 2001), ‘modernity 
at large’ (Appadurai 1996) and ‘colonial modernities’ (for example Burton 1999)—to name only a 
few—have developed within the field of cultural anthropology during the past two decades.  
Although restraints of space and cohesiveness prevent a comprehensive discussion of these 
concepts here, a few points may be noted.  The discipline from which these terms originate 
necessitates a cultural interpretation of modernity, and all argue that modernity is itself 
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undergoing transformation even as it transforms.  ‘Alternative modernities’, in particular, has so 
much in common with multiple modernities that it is surprising that each approach has so 
infrequently acknowledged the existence of the other.  The former, too, claims that societal 
modernisation does not invariably lead to certain institutional orders or interpretative 
frameworks, and that the form modernity takes is greatly contingent on a unique response to 
local culture and politics (Goankar 2001: 16).   
Perhaps the most important contribution alternative modernities is able to make to the 
questions posed in the previous section concerns the notion of “creative adaptation”, according 
to which people ‘make’ themselves modern and actively construct their own notion of 
modernity (Gaonkar 2001: 17).  This would fit nicely into the emphasis on agency and autonomy 
discussed earlier, and provides a valuable bridge between societal convergence and cultural 
diversity.  Thus the African diaspora, for example, is portrayed as possessing a uniquely modern 
consciousness of its own construction (Gilroy 1993).  An added and crucial advantage of such an 
approach is the mechanism it could provide for the creation of manageable and meaningful units 
of analysis—now fragmentation has a countervailing force to prevent endless miniscule 
variations in modernity.  As Gaonkar (2001: 23) puts it, ‘just as societal modernisation (the prime 
source of convergence theories) produces difference through creative adaptation or unintended 
consequences, so also cultural modernity (the prime source of divergence theories) produces 
similarities in its own borders’.   
Unfortunately, the concept of alternative modernities has yet to operationalise this interplay, 
and has hitherto thus had little overall impact in the study of modernity.  It is even more lacking 
in formal definitions and hypotheses than is the theory of multiple modernities.  Its 
conceptualisation of modernity itself is scanty, and its cases have been highly specific and 
anthropological in nature—snapshots rather than theories.  Of course, much of this is due to the 
aims of its discipline, but this does mean that alternative modernities can only supplement, 
never supplant, a comprehensive theory of macropolitical and societal change.  Similarly, 
Appadurai's (1996) ‘modernity at large’ seeks to analyse the globalisation of modernity primarily 
by focusing on the interplay between literature, history, ethnography and postcolonial studies, 
but deals little with the political forces that multiple modernity theorists rightly seek to 
incorporate into their analysis.  In addition, its view of modernisation as largely positive 
overlooks some of the tensions inherent in this process, tensions which multiple modernities 
aims to elucidate. 
This notion that modernity is constructed, perhaps by political elites or certain other indigenous 
modernising actors, is already present to a certain extent in the multiple modernities literature.  
Duara (2001), for example, argues that contemporary civilisations, in their essentialist, reified 
forms, resulted from the modernity project of the early 20th century rather than from authentic 
historical trajectories.  By creating civilisations which embodied supposed sets of values defined 
in binary to the West, they were able to lend authority to political leadership and were 
appropriated by the nation-state system (Duara 2001).   
If multiple modernities theory is to use comparative civilisational and cultural analysis as part of 
its toolbox (and I would argue that it is here where its unique contribution lies) it would do well 
to focus on how such identities are constructed.  In this, it can also draw from theories of social 
constructivism, which argue that international norms and agents mutually constitute each other 
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and that identities and values often play a greater role in politics than do institutional or 
mercantilist concerns (for example Checkel 1998, Risse 2002).  To return to the case of India, an 
analysis of whether various social groupings—the BJP, the Indian National Congress, the unions, 
the middle class and others—view themselves as modern and how they conceive of modernity 
itself could be useful in understanding the evolution of the concept.   The most promising 
contribution in this regard has come from Wagner (2008b), who argues that civilisations are only 
one particular form of ‘societal self-understanding’.  By taking ‘societal self-understandings’ as 
the primary unit of analysis, multiple modernities would better be able to account for the myriad 
contested and dynamic ways in which people in heterogenous political units, such as Brazil or 
South Africa, interpret their modern trajectories (Wagner 2008b). 
Another alternative is Taylor's distinction between cultural and acultural theories of modernity.  
This, like multiple modernities, takes issue with theories which view modernity as value- and 
culture-neutral—as the revealing of humanity's universal, ‘true nature’ once old views are 
eventually sloughed off (Taylor 1995: 173).  Even many anti-modern theories hold this view, 
hence their fear that traditional values are under threat.  Instead, and this is where this theory 
diverges sharply from multiple modernities, Taylor (1995: 180) advocates a view of modernity as 
inextricably linked to Western assumptions about the individual, about science, and about 
religion.  This ‘cultural theory of modernity’ means that societal and political changes are 
determined by our habitus--the unconscious backdrop against which explicit values and 
decisions are made (Bourdieu quoted in Taylor 1995)--and can thus never be free of culturally-
specific assumptions.   
Taylor's distinction, in many ways diametrically opposed to multiple modernities in its view of 
modernity as (in some, if not in all ways) fundamentally European,  nonetheless suffers from 
some familiar problems.  If habitus determines the extent and form of social change, this change 
must result in some sort of feedback loop which prevents cultural backgrounds from being static 
and inflexible.  In addition, it is never fully specified whether modernity is capable of being 
reinterpreted by non-European cultures, and how this would occur. 
A more plausible alternative to multiple modernities has also been proposed by its fiercest critic.  
Inspired by the literature on ‘varieties of capitalism’, Schmidt (2006, 2008) has argued that 
‘varieties of modernity’ exist, but that the differences between them are family differences 
rather than differences in type.  By focusing on culture, it is alleged, multiple modernities ignores 
the institutional and structural convergence that has been occurring throughout the world.  Not 
only does it not accurately define its central concepts, but it lacks a clear methodology and is 
dangerously selective about the differences between nations that it chooses to acknowledge.  
‘The question is not, at least cannot seriously be, whether there is diversity in the world...but 
what do we make of it?’, Schmidt (2006: 78) asks.  Before we can speak of multiple modernities, 
he answers, we need to establish carefully whether coherent patterns of institutional 
covariation exist and what forms these pattern take.  Because Schmidt suspects that the more 
fundamental differences are between modern and premodern societies rather than among 
modern ones (Schmidt 2006: 87), his proposal can be seen partially as an attempt to rehabilitate 
convergence theory and to bring it up to date with the current political and social reality.   
Many of these points are valid, and will have to be taken seriously by advocates of multiple 
modernities theory.  It is not enough to note that diversity exists, and the next step must surely 
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be to construct typologies and similar comparative frameworks to make sense of these diversity.  
Jepperson's (2002) division of European ‘multiple political modernities’ into ‘social-corporate’, 
‘state-corporate’, ‘state-nation’ and ‘liberal’ variants, and Wagner's (1994) examination of 
mutations of Western modernity are examples of important site-specific work that has been 
done in this regard.   
However, many of Schmidt’s conclusions are as much a function of his institutional focus as 
those of multiple modernities are predicated on cultural analysis.  Institutions are more 
malleable and measurable than culture, and phenomena such as urbanisation or 
democratisation more tangible (but not necessarily more important) than values such as 
autonomy or rationality.  Schmidt suspects that modern-day Japan is more similar to 
contemporary Canada or Germany than it is to traditional Japan (2006: 81), but this depends on 
how convergence is operationalised.  
In addition, allegations that multiple modernities has not at least attempted to define modernity 
are only partially justified, and shows an unfamiliarity with some of the more recent literature 
on the subject (for example Eisenstadt et al 2005).   Finally, Schmidt (2006: 8) admits that a 
systematic enquiry into the varieties of modernity would have to study society in its entirety and 
that ‘putting it to work may prove a task of such stupendous proportions that it cannot actually 
be accomplished’.  One way to avoid such overambition, it would seem, would be to focus 
exactly at the level that Schmidt eschews.  An emphasis on institutions alone has clearly not 
worked, as the spirited global critique of modernity and continuing impact of identity, value and 
culture has shown.  An examination of how certain key cultural values have impacted—or failed 
to impact— on society is preferable to an approach which focuses only on the type of change 
which is often easily reversed and cosmetic.  As a result of these limitations, the varieties of 
modernity approach has yet to be developed, whether by Schmidt or others, beyond the level of 
critique.  
Lastly, there are of course those who would prefer we do away with the study of modernity 
altogether.  Whether theorists of postmodernity who argue that modernity has been 
‘abandoned...destroyed, liquidated’ (Lyotard 1984: 111), globalisation theorists who either 
conflate the two or see globalisation as replacing modernity (for example, Mazlish 2001) or  
those who claim that ‘we have never been modern’ to begin with (for instance, Latour 1993): all 
might argue that multiple modernities needs no alternative. 
Such a view seems short-sighted, however, when one observes the polarising and mobilising 
effect that the concept of modernity continues to have in myriad societies.  In countries as 
diverse as Turkey, China, Iran and Thailand, modernisation is one of the primary issues on the 
political agenda. Clashing interpretations of modernity can cause immense conflict; 
fundamentalisms of all kinds cannot fully be explained without reference to the concept, as we 
have seen.   
It is not enough to cede the floor to globalisation, above all a process or vehicle rather than a 
substantive phenomenon.  Nor can postmodernity step into the breach, as its debates and 
insights have been mainly confined to the European and North American experience.  Ironically, 
as modernity has been deconstructed in the West, it has been reconstructed in Asia, South 
America and—to a lesser extent—Africa, where there is a conscious attempt to indigenise 
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modernity without simultaneously ‘Westernising’.  Wallerstein (1995: 472) expresses it well 
when he observes: 
The appeal of this kind of modernity [built on technological progress] has still not 
exhausted itself.  There may be no doubt millions of children of the new age who 
assert that they reject this eternal quest for speed and for control of the 
environment…But there are billions—billions, not millions—of persons in Asia and 
Africa, in Easter Europe and Latin America, in the slums and ghettoes of Western 
Europe and America, who yearn to enjoy fully this kind of modernity. 
5 Concluding thoughts 
Multiple modernities is a promising theory in an area of political sociology that is still 
underdeveloped and which has had to contend with wide-ranging global transformations.  The 
approach itself, however, is still in need of further development if it is to go beyond the level of 
critique.  This paper has argued that multiple modernities, perhaps uniquely, faces attacks on 
two fronts: its focus on a plurality of modernities leads some to accuse it of deconstructing the 
concept to the point of meaninglessness, whereas its use of cultures, religions and civilisations 
as units of analysis lead to accusations from exactly the opposite end of the spectrum.   
Ultimately, multiple modernities will have to confront the fact that, for modernity to retain any 
utility as a concept, we must be able to speak, as well, of the ‘unmodern’.  Until now, the 
concept has been very uncomfortable with such an approach, preferring instead to argue that 
we live in an age of modernity where proposals and counterproposals all use certain key, 
modern principles as reference points.  However, this is not empirically, conceptually or 
theoretically satisfactory.  It is preferable, instead, to view modernity as a single, coherent 
force—albeit one which is continually contested, can be reversed, and does not always get its 
way.  Because this force will encounter different historical, cultural and political realities 
wherever it appears, the end result will inherently vary greatly from society to society.    
Of course, many will view such an argument with trepidation:  ‘can the designation of something 
or some group as non- or pre-modern ever be anything but a gesture of the powerful?’ 
(Chakrabarty 2002: xix).  However, this was a far greater danger before the Janus-faced nature 
of modernity was truly recognised, and when modernity was still viewed as a holy grail which 
could cure all the superstitions and afflictions of society.  Instead, modernity theory should 
approach modernity as input rather than outcome, and view the ‘fully modern society’ as one 
(unrealisable and probably undesirable) end of a continuum, rather than one side of a 
dichotomy.  Modernity is not the definition of a society, but rather one force among several.  
The fact that none of the multiple modernities literature has as yet attempted a case study of 
‘African modernity’ indicates that even it is perhaps vaguely aware of the uncomfortable 
possibility that different levels of modernity may exist within this ‘modern age’ of ours.    
Once multiple modernities has refined its conceptual framework, it will be able to design 
methodologies and hypotheses that will allow it to contribute to a better understanding of the 
forms into which modernity has crystallised around the world.  It will also be able to make use of 
social constructivism and creative adaptation in order to better determine whether modernity is 
better studied at the level of the civilisation, the state, the nation or the region.  What it should 
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not do, however, is abandon its unique focus on culture and society.  To finish, an example:  a 
theorist concerned with the institutions of modernity, upon observing Iran in 1978, would have 
come away with the impression that the country had embarked on the road to a future very 
similar to that of Europe, the United States or, for that matter, Japan.  She would little have been 
able to understand the roiling tensions beneath the institutional surface, or predicted the 
eruption that would occur only a year later.  As theorists of modernity, that most revolutionary 
of concepts, we must look deep beneath the surface for the forces that continue to shape the 
21st century. 
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